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All Collections > The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus > Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 8 - 13. > book four. distinctions 8 - 13 > twelfth distinction. second part: about the action of the accidents in the eucharist > single question. whether accidents in the eucharist can have any action they were able to have in their subject > ii. to the initial arguments > b. to the second argument > 2. a doubt and its solution
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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
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Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 8 - 13.
Book Four. Distinctions 8 - 13
Twelfth Distinction. Second Part: About the Action of the Accidents in the Eucharist
Single Question. Whether Accidents in the Eucharist can Have Any Action they were Able to Have in their Subject
II. To the Initial Arguments
B. To the Second Argument
2. A Doubt and its Solution

2. A Doubt and its Solution

291. And if you ask, ‘does a separated quantity without a quality act on the senses?’, it seems that it does.

292. Because it is per se perceptible, On the Soul 2.6.418a17-20.

293. And again, it could act on the intellect, because it is per se intelligible; but it could not act on our intellect unless it first acts on the senses;     therefore etc     .

294. To the contrary, because a quantity is not perceptible primarily; but that which is not per se perceptible primarily cannot act without what is perceptible primarily.

295. It could be said that the quantity would not be perceived because: either it would (according to some) have no action on the senses by impressing on them its own species but only the proper sensibles do (the common sensibles,50 however, only do something for the manner of affecting the senses); or if a common sensible cause its own species along with a proper sensible (otherwise how could it properly be perceived?), yet it cannot cause it without the concomitance of a proper sensible - not indeed that it would not be prior to the primarily sensible quality and so able to be separated in itself from that quality, but that it would not be prior in acting on the senses, and so, insofar as it is of such sort, it is not separable from a proper sensible.

296. And perhaps the reason is that by which the senses are primarily receptive powers of their proper object; and therefore from nothing else can they receive another act unless they are naturally prior in this act.

297. And thus is plain the answer to the first argument [n.292].

298. As to the second [n.293] I say that a quantity could move the intellect if it were proportionate to it or proportionately present to it; but it is not so for our intellect, because a quantity can become primarily present to our intellect only through the species, and it cannot be caused in the intellect if the species of the object were not first in the senses.